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▒▒▒▒ Article 004 ▒▒▒▒

ASSESING KOSOVA HACKERS SECURITY USING F.A.R.T.S

Kosova Hackers Security was a hacking group that gained notoriety for its brush with terrorism. Although the group is now defunct, an assessment of its technical sophistication provides valuable insights into the capabilities and limitations of such groups. This article employs the Framework for Assessing RPT Technical Sophistication (F.A.R.T.S) to evaluate Kosova Hackers Security.

1. CNA Capabilities

Kosova Hackers Security exhibited moderate Computer Network Attack (CNA) capabilities. They primarily focused on website defacements and DDoS attacks. Their activities in this domain would be rated as Medium (5).

2. CNE Capabilities

The group's Computer Network Exploitation (CNE) skills were unsophisticated. They were capable of performing SQL injections, bruteforcing, and other basic techniques such as phishing attacks but lacked advanced offensive capabilities. Their CNE capabilities would be rated as Low (3).

3. Operational Security

The group's operational security was low. The case of Ardit Ferizi, an member of KHS, exposed significant vulnerabilities in the group. Ferizi was arrested due to poor operational security, including the use of easily traceable digital footprints, unencrypted communications, and accounts linked to his real identity. This also suggests that the group's HUMINT counterintelligence efforts were lacking, and were exploited by ISIS recruiters. Their operational security would be rated as Low (1).

IMPORTANT OBERVATION: The radicalization pathway of Ardit Ferizi remains publicly undisclosed, leaving open the question of whether he was self-radicalized or recruited through a HUMINT recruitment cycle. If he truly was recruited through a HUMINT operation, it would highlight the strategic depth of ISIS's recruitment capabilities, potentially indicating a more coordinated effort to integrate cyber skills into their operational portfolio. Either scenario would exemplify how states and powerful entities can exploit RPTs as force multipliers in cyberspace to advance their broader strategic goals.

4. Organization Management

Kosova Hackers Security operated with a loose organizational structure, often coordinating through online forums and chat rooms. They would be rated as Low (1) in organizational management.

5. Persistence Factor

The group engaged in sporadic campaigns with periods of inactivity, earning them a Medium (2) rating for their persistence factor.

Overall Threat Assessment

According to the F.A.R.T.S framework, the defunct Kosova Hackers Security scored a total of 12, categorizing them as a RPT with Low Sophistication.

Article 003 - Assessing Belarusian Cyber Partisans using F.A.R.T.S.
Article 005 - ???????